T\TYU ANNUAL SURVEY Of AMERICAN L-\'vV [Vol. 58:357 offered two alternative rationales for its holding, striking down the laws in question not only as discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause but also as state laws preempted by federal poli cies.7 The question posed by the 1996 welfare legislation under these precedents is whether state discrimination against aliens in the distribution of public benefits should still be subject to strict scrutiny when this discrimination is explicitly authorized by Con gress. Some commentators have argued in favor of strict scrutiny, based on the theory that Congress cannot devolve its power to dis criminate against aliens to the states." In Aliessa v. Novello, the Court of Appeals of New York recently agreed, applying strict scru tiny and striking down a New York law discriminating against aliens in the distribution of Medicaid benefits despite federal authoriza tion for such discriminationY
In this essay, I offer a skeptical view of the "nondevolvability principle," which would apply strict scrutiny to restrictions imposed by the states on alien access to public benefits even when such re strictions are explicitly authorized by Congress.10 My analysis of this claim takes the holdings in Graham and Diaz as given. Within those constraints, I raise some questions regarding the policy rationales commonly advanced in favor of a rule of nondevolvability.
Nondevolvability would prevent the federal government from authorizing discrimination by the states under circumstances in which the U.S. Constitution would prevent the states from discrimi nating under their own authority. Why should we, as a policy mat ter, want to prevent the federal government from authorizing states to discriminate against aliens in the allocation of public benefits?
The Graham Court declared that "Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protec tion Clause."'' We may regard this declaration as dictum, given that the Graham Court held that Congress had not authorized the discrimination at issue in that case.12 In any event, this declaration begs the question: why should we think that the states are still violat ing the Equal Protection Clause when they act with federal authori- 9. 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001 ) . 10. Wishnie, supra note 8, at 558.
11. 403 U.S. at 382.
12. See id. at 380-83.
zation?1:>, In Diaz, afte.-all, the Court indicated that the federal government itself has broad powers to discriminate against aliens.
1·1
The Diaz Court placed the "responsibility for regulating the re lationship between the United States and our alien visitors" with "the political branches of the Federal Government."1'-, Because "these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers," I.
UNIFORt \1I1Y AND THE RJGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL
The Graham Court suggested that the problem with such an authorization is that it would allow for divergent state policies, con trary to the requirement of "an uniform Rule of Naturalization" in 13. There are other contexts in which Congress may authorize state laws that would be unconstitutional in the absence of such authorization. See, e.g., North east Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitu tional attack under the Commerce Clause."); Wishnie, sujJra note 8, at 539-41 (dis cussing foreign affai rs); id. at 546-47 (discussing the regulation of foreign commerce); id. at 561 (discussing Native American jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause).
14. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1971) . These powers distinguish restric tions on alien access to public benefits from the California welfare law stntck clown by the Court in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 ( 1999) INS, 8 F.�d 645, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1993 ).
Our immigration policies may apply to aliens differently de pending upon the state in which they married or in which they committed a crime. Thus, there is nothing unusual about Congress deciding that, as a matter of federal immigration policy, we should allow the states to determine some specified aspects of that policy.
The states are not entrusted with immigration policy in the absence of such federal invitation. Even with federal authorization, as when states decide which crimes to punish severely enough to trigger de portation, states may make their divergent decisions without immi gration consequences in mind. Nevertheless, we leave it to Congress to decide whether this state role and the discretion it al lows for the adoption of divergent policies serves federal policies regarding the treatment of aliens. The problem with the Graham rationale, however, is that it proves too much. A state could impose precisely the same eco nomic burden on the alien by failing to provide this public assis tance to citizens and aliens alike. Graham unless we require all states not only to provide public assis tance but also to do so using precisely the same eligibility criteria.
Otherwise, there will be some indigent aliens unable to move into states that impose more stringent eligibilit-y criteria. If we do not consider it unconstitutional for states to adopt divergent welfare policies in general, then why should we regard it as problematic if they adopt divergent welfare policies regarding aliens in particular?
II.
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES AND THE

INTERESTS OF ALIENS
The Graham rationale calls for uniform welfare policies among the states, but the Gr aham holding calls for uniform treatment of citizens and aliens in state welfare programs. These are two differ ent l)'pes of uniformity, and there is no necessary logical connec tion between the two. The poor fit between the policy rationale and the holding indicates that a different policy concern actually animates the Court's holding."'0 A rule barring discrimination against aliens is more plausibly explained as an expression of the "antidiscrimination and anticaste principles" cited by Michael
Wishnie in support of a rule of nondevolvability."'1 If we seek to derive an antidiscrimination rationale for nondevolvabilit:y from
Graham, however, we run into two problems posed by the Court's subsequent decision in Diaz. only way to ensure that we uphold the antidiscrimination principle in the context of public benefits is to overturn Diaz itself.'"7 As long as we take Diaz seriously, however, antidiscrimination principles provide no sound rationale for a constitutional rule of nondevolv ability.
III.
NONDELEGAT ION CONCERNS
Gilbert Paul Carrasco has also suggested that federal authoriza tion for the states to discriminate against aliens in the distribution of federal benefits represents a delegation by Congress of a non delegable legislative power.3s Noting th at the nondelegation doc trine has "fallen into desuetude,"'�� he nevertheless urges a revival of the doctrine. In particular, he claims that federal authorization for discrimination by the states impermissibly delegates the power vested exclusively in Congress by the Naturalization Clause:10
This claim is questionable on a number of grounds. First, the Naturalization Clause is not the sole source of federal power to dis criminate against aliens in public benefits. 11 Second, the federal government is not delegating an exclusively federal power when it authorizes the states to discriminate against aliens. After all, even without federal authorization, states may discriminate against aliens, subject to judicial review under a rational basis test in some contexts, but subject to strict judicial scrutiny in other contexts, in cluding public benefits.4::2 Thus, even under Graham, the states en joy some power to discriminate against aliens, even with respect to public benefits. That is, the states and the federal government have concurrent powers to discriminate against aliens in public benefits, albeit with stricter judicial scrutiny normally applied to the states, such that the states bear a heavier burden in justifying such discrimination.
Even overruling Diaz would not necessarily serve the interest� of aliens.
To the extent that the courts make it difficult for Congress and the states to ex clude immigrants from public benefits, Congress may respond by imposing more severe restrictions on the immigration of indigent aliens, excluding aliens who would have been better off if allowed to immigrate subject to the condition that they not accept the public benefits in question. Application of the antidiscrimina tion principle to public benefits alone will have uncertain effe cts on the welt�tre of aliens as long as Congress retains its plenary power over immigration policies. Viewed in this light, the issue is not really whether Congress may delegate or devolve the federal power to regulate relations with aliens, but rather whether federal authorization granted in the ex ercise of that plenary power should affect the degree of scru tiny that courts apply to a state exercising its own concurrent power to discriminate against aliens. Given the degree of judicial deference accorded to the decisions made by the political branches of the fe d eral government on these matters, it seems logical that authoriza tion by these branches should imply similar deference for state laws enacted with prior federal approval.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Washingt on v. Ya kima Indian Nation applied such deferential review to a state law pertaining to Native
Americans that had been authorized by federal statute but chal lenged under the Equal Protection Clause.4� Noting that the state '\vas legislating under explicit authority granted by Congress," which authorized the state law "in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs ," the Court subjected the state law to the same rationality revievv that would have been applied to federal legisla tion "singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitution ally offensive," rather than the stricter scrutiny usually applied to state laws on the subject. 535, 553 n.24, 554 (1974) . Tribal classifications are thus similar to alienage classifications, which are also "political" insofar as aliens are normally members of a fo reign sovereign entity. Wishnie tries to distin guish Yakima Indian Nation by arguing that alienage classifications are more "ra cial" than tribal classifications, citing the analogy drawn by the Graham court between alienage and racial classifications. See Wishnie, sujJra note 8, at 564-65 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ). Tribal classifications, however, like racial classifications, may be based on prejudice or antipathy, and cannot be distinguished from alienage classifications on this basis.
46. Despite cases applying rational ity review to uphold statutes over the objec ti on of Native Americans, Wishnie argues that rationality review is only appropriate fo r legislation that brnefits Native Americans. See vVishnie, sujna. note 8, at 562 & [Vol. 58:3!17 Even if the nondelegation doctrine itself is inapplicable to the 1996 welhue legislation, the policy conce rns cited in support of the nonclelegation doctrine may also support a rule inhibiting federal authorization for states to discriminate against aliens. Carrasco, for example, suggests that "forcing the elected representatives of Con gress to make the most difficult policy choices" is a reason to revive the nondelegation doctrine. fi The desire to make Congress more politically accountable and to prevent it from evading responsibility for policy choices, however, is quite general. Unless courts are pre pared to apply the nonclelegation doctrine broadly in other con texts, those who invoke nonclelegation concerns bear the burden of explaining why these concerns are especially acute when Congress authorizes the states to restrict alien access to public benefits.
Once we seek a more specific reason to apply a rule of nondevolvability in this particular context, we run into many of the same problems that we encountered with the other proposed policy rationales for such a rule. For example, if the concern is that states will engage in a race to the bottom as they seek to encourage the indigent to reside in other states, then the argument seems to prove too much. This concern is not limited to the question of alien ac cess to public benefits. One might expect such a race in any in stance in which states are authorized to choose divergent welfare policies, whether the indigent are aliens or citizens. ·H' If the claim is that questions regarding aliens in particular should be resolved na tionwide by the federal government, we must explain why vve have long allowed states to adopt divergent policies regarding unautho rized immigrants, including their access to public benefits. n.352. But SPe Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 ( 1990) (noting "the Federal Gov ernment's broad authority to legislate with respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or benefits"). vV ishnie argues that these cases do not suggest that "rationality review is appropriate for fe derally authorized state welfare laws that discriminate against immigrants. " \1Vishnie, sujna note 8, at 562. Even if the effect of federal authorization were constrained as \Nish nie suggests, however, Congress could easily avoid this constraint by requiring the exclusion of aliens from public benefits in the absence of state legislation to the contrary. This de fa ult rule would imply that all state welfare laws would bnrrjlt aliens compared to the fe derally specified alternative of exclusion. It is hard to see what we would accomplish by requiring Congress to specit)' a cliscriminaton· default rule in any legislation authorizing divergent state policies regarding alien access to public ben efits. If anything, requiring this fo rmality would seem to increase the likelihood that states will adopt discrimination agai nst aliens by debult. Such an effe ct hardly serves the antidiscrimination principles that Wishnie stresses.
47. Carrasco, supra note 8, at 628. 48. See Note, De-uolving 'vl' el farP Progmrns to the Stales: A Fu/J!ir Choice Prnpative, 109 HAR\'. L. RE\". 1984 RE\". , 1985 RE\". (1996 .
If the claim is that the states are more susceptible to xenopho bic passions than the federal govern ment, then the concern would appear to be the protecti on of aliens from disc rimination, and the question again becomes whether a rule of no ndevolvability would serve that objective. Even if it were clear that states are more in clined as a general matter to discriminate against aliens than the fede ral government is, we can presun1 e that a Congress authorizing the states to discriminate would understand the consequences ex pec ted to flow from its authorization, and we can thus infer that such a Congress is itself inclined to discriminate against aliens.
Therefore, a rule that would fr ustrate authorization for divergent state policies may well lead such a Congress to exclude aliens fr om welfare programs nationwide.
For example, to the extent that we generally expect foreign policy concerns to inhibit the federal government from discriminat ing against aliens, we would expect these pressures to apply also to the federal government's decision to authorize discrimination by the states or to repeal such an authorization. Therefore, a Con gress that nevertheless authorizes discrimination by the states is likely to be a Congress that would otherwise choose discrimination itself. By the same token , a Congress that refuses to repeal an au thorization to discriminate is likely to be a Congress that would re fuse to repeal any discriminatory rule that it had itself imposed. A rule of nondevolvability only ensures that the federal response is uniform, not that it will be kind to aliens.
vVe may accuse Congress of avoiding difficult policy choices when it authorizes the states to make these choices instead, but we might also consider this response to be an appropriate compromise in the face of conflicting preferences. If Congress determines that the resolution of these matters need not be uniform nationwide, then it may be desirable to allow different sides to prevail in differ ent states. Uniformity entails costs insofar as it prevents states from choosing policies tailored to local preferences. Congress might have thought it unfair to burden those states that have a dispropor tionate share of indigent immigrants. States, after all, have no power to regulate immigration, and Graham forces them to provide aliens access to public benefits on the same terms granted citizens.
If required to impose a uniform rule nationwide, Congress could respond to these concerns with a nationwide rule of exclusion, im posed even on those states that would prefer to be more generous. promise in which states can choose different responses to such is sues. Thus, the rationale for a rule of nondevolvability remains obscure. Even if we perceive some val ue to having Congress bear the responsibility for such decisions alone rather than sharing this responsibility ·with the states, we must weigh th is benefit against the costs of imposing a rigid unifonTl rule nationwide.
TV. CONCLUSION
A rule that is consistent with the deference given to the politi cal branches in Diaz wendel defer to those branches when they choose to authorize divergent state policies. If the policy rationale for such deference is to give th e political branches greater freedom in the conduct of our relations with fo reigners, then this policy is undercut by applying strict scrutiny to th e state policies authorized by those branches:L9 If the un derlying purpose of this freedom is to enable the political branches of the fed eral government to use the treatment of aliens as a bargain ing chip in international negotia tions, for example, then judicially imposed constraints only curtail this freedom.''° For the federal government to negotiate with for eign governments on these matters, it must retain control over alien access to public benefits. For this purpose, it is sufficient that the federal government maintain the exclusive powers to authorize discrimination by the states and to repeal that authorization. As long as this authorization is revocable, the federal government ulti mately retains control over our relations with aliens, whether it dis criminates against aliens directly or authorizes the states to discriminate . If the federal government is to maintain this control, a rule of nondevolvability is unnecessary. Thus, giving effect to fed eral authorization for the states to discriminate is more consistent with a theory that reconciles Graham and Diaz in a coherent way.
49 . S!'e Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 ( 1976) ("Any rule of constitutional law that \vould inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution.").
50. The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that if Congress or the President were to impose a citizenship requirement for fe deral service, "it would be justified lw the national interest in providing an incentive fo r aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as providing the President with an expendable token for treaty negotiating purposes." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976) . We could say the same for authorization by Congress and the President for states to impose citizenship requirements fo r public benefit�. which would also create such incentives or tokens with the prior blessing of the fe deral institutions with respon sibility for fo reign afL1irs.
